Meniscus 'zine

Changing American Diplomacy

by Wade-Hahn Chan

As the world’s largest superpower, the United States takes pride in acting as role model of conduct to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, America harbored an insatiable wanderlust for new lands and frontiers. Ever since the western end of the North American continent was gleaned of untainted nature, the United States engaged in many efforts to annex, take over, or gain lands in various parts of the world. Through the years, the United States would attempt to take a share in Nicaragua, Hawaii, Texas, and parts of Southern China. Though reasonably successful, the cost of moving around such a large amount of military power were too high, and interest in acquiring lands dwindled. The Old Imperialism slowly became a taboo subject, as no American could consider themselves "invaders" of any sort. The new imperialism (sometimes called globalization) changed the playing field of imperialism. It eliminated any need for shows of military superiority or occupation by threat and force. With the quick boosts within the communications industry, America was able to project itself in a wider, more bombastic fashion, and became the overwhelming proprietor of new imperialism. Other countries were shown freshly presented products sold regularly within American democracy and capitalism. Soon, capitalist businesses were able to flourish within many other countries throughout the world.

However, the new imperialism can have less noticeable, but equally destructive effects, as it attacks a people’s lifestyle and culture. Not everyone enjoys these changes; those that don’t harbor anti-capitalist and anti-American feelings because of this invasion of culture. Other times, governments installed by the United States in an effort to "bring stability" to a region will become bloodthirsty dictators who cause more terror and damage to the region than even before U.S. involvement. The FBI named this effect "blowback." By it’s original definition, blowback is the backwards escape of unexploded gunpowder when firing a handgun. In diplomatic terms, it is an unpredicted, negative response against a nation in regards to a diplomatic action that country has undertaken. However, the ultimate effect of either definition of blowback is the same: if a nation expects to act strongly, expect to sometimes get burned along the way. The United States, through its underhanded dealings with its enemies, has caused blowback many times throughout its history, leading to bad diplomatic relations and hundreds of millions of people dead. The only ways the United States can stem the effects of blowback is by ending relations with otherwise untrustworthy nations and learn to deal with conflicts and problems in a more open and magnanimous manner.

September 11th, the day the World Trade Center was destroyed by an act of terror, is a tragic example of the dangers of blowback. Four jetliners were hijacked by apparent Islamic fundamentalists and were used to hit the Pentagon in Washington DC and destroy the World Trade Center in New York City. Although not proved to have been directly involved, the outcast Saudi prince, Osama Bin Laden was implicated. Bin Laden is well known for his anti-American and extreme fundamentalist views, and, because of his royalty, has the assets to fund and organize large-scale terrorist operations. Riding on the assumption that Bin Laden was behind the September 11th attacks, the United States gave the ultimatum that countries that housed terrorists would be held accountable as well as the terrorists themselves. Afghanistan, the supposed current shelter for Bin Laden, refused to extradite Bin Laden directly to the United States. In response, the United States has mobilized the military to engage Afghanistan in war.

At this juncture, it’s important to look further back behind the conflict in Afghanistan, just before the United States took interest in the war-torn country. In 1978, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. The invasion was much like the takeover and assimilation of Czechoslovakia; in this case, the Communist reforms were an affront to the Afghani way of life, compelling them to fight back with whatever means possible (Adamec, 212). The Afghani people were under equipped and had no military training, but were determined to drive the Soviets out. The United States saw this as a golden opportunity to engage the Soviet Union, the "evil communist empire" of the Cold War, on a battlefield. The sand blasted landscapes that hold extreme fluctuations in seasonal temperatures was the perfect spawning ground for a Soviet defeat. With the blessings of the United States CIA and training from U.S. Special Forces and British Special Air Services, a counter-revolutionary force was organized from the beleaguered Afghani citizens under the name of "Mujaheedin" (Adamec, 213). The Mujaheedin engaged in a seven-year war that finally ended when the Soviet Union realized it had wasted enormous amounts of resources and personnel in the region and pulled out (Adamec, 215).

The Mujaheedin took over the country as a coalition government. The United States and NATO chose to fund and train the Taliban to ensure that the Soviet Union would be defeated. Taliban troops were trained in clandestine operations by the Central Intelligence Agency and guerilla warfare tactics by Saudi and Pakistan Intelligence Agencies with the support of the CIA (Johnson, Blowback: The Cost…, 72). Weapons, vehicles, and equipment were provided as well. Finally, sabotage and terror techniques were taught to choice agents by the Central Intelligence Agency to aide the Taliban’s efforts. A Saudi Prince named Osama Bin Laden, who was instrumental in funding the war against the Soviets, took an active role in the Taliban’s military coup, which was successful.

The Taliban, however, were vilified in the American press for their fundamental ideals and their oppression of women. The administration at the time, under President Clinton, spoke out vehemently against the methods the Taliban employed. Osama Bin Laden, already harboring distinctly and anti-capitalist beliefs, had a means to put his anti-American ideals in action. He funded and opened a terrorist camp; a teaching facility where any person would be able to receive the same SAS combat tactics and CIA intelligence techniques that the Taliban and Mujaheedin already had (Adamec, 190). Saudi Arabia, an Arab nation who was a long time ally to the United States, immediately exiled their errant prince. Under the guise of protecting Islamic interests from the ideals of U.S. capitalism, Bin Laden was said to have instigated several attacks on U.S. buildings and institutions before having agents destroy the World Trade Center and part of the Pentagon on September 11th.

Currently, the Taliban is on the run from its last strongholds in Afghanistan. Victory for the United States and its allies is almost assured. Unfortunately, it’s unclear whether or not the governmental ideals held by the Northern Alliance troops will be an improvement over the Taliban, as the Northern Alliance consists mostly of former Mujaheedin rebels and revolutionaries. The tribes of Afghanistan have shown that a show of solidarity is difficult, particularly when running the entire country. The American government and the U.N. Security Council are unsure of their abilities as well, calling for a post-war peacekeeping task force to oversee the country as well as a coalition government between the tribes, who have a history of infighting. Unfortunately, this end result is an almost exact copy of the solution that was employed after the Soviets pulled out of the country almost 15 years earlier.

Though Bin Laden’s case was a horrifying model of the serious effects of blowback, another recent conflict, the Gulf War, can also be shown as a far subtler one. When Islamic fundamentalist Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the American-backed capitalist leader of Iran, the Shah, the United States put forth a rigorous effort to try to wrest back control after the Ayatollah proclaimed Americans as enemies and took hostages for a protracted period of time. Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, saw the turmoil and Iran and became seriously interested in wresting full control of lands that were co-owned by Iran (Hillsman, 64). However, Iraq’s forces were meager compared to the post-coup forces of the Ayatollah. Seeing an opportunity to strike back at Iran without engaging in any military actions, the United States provided billions of dollars worth of training, equipment, armored vehicles, and chemical weapons, such as mustard gas, to Iraq (Hillsman, 64). Saddam Hussein was considered a hero in America and was praised by the Reagan administration.

None in the government predicted Saddam’s campaign of genocide against the Kurds, nor his invasion of the upper-class country of Kuwait for their lucrative oil fields (Hillsman, 110). President Bush, Vice President during the Reagan administration, went through great lengths to intimidate the former ally into stopping his invasion. Eventually, the United States established a military foothold in Saudi Arabia and invaded Iraq in what is now known as the Gulf War. Bush’s reasons for invading Iraq was primarily to protect our oil interests and supply, even though only 10% of America’s oil supply comes from the Middle East. Preventing the genocide of the Kurds was not an objective because Saddam continued his campaign unhindered after the war was over. Bush engaged this campaign rigorously out of embarrassment of past dealings with Saddam.

The media coverage aided this by pushing Bush’s image as a protector of Kuwait. Great lengths were taken to ensure that little coverage was given towards President Bush’s past involvement and dealings with the Iraqi general (Baudrillard, 76). Although the knowledge was public, it was easier to downplay the information to avoid any potential dissonance or even potential censure. All of this has been done in an effort to maintain a sense of public unity and patriotism. Situations like this have already presented themselves during the current crisis with Afghanistan. Bill Maher, the moderator for political humor show "Politically Incorrect," was taken off the air after he made a statement that the followers of Bin Laden were not cowards for their terrorist actions. Aaron MacGruder, author of nationally syndicated comic strip Boondocks was removed from several newspapers after authoring a strip that spoke of the Reagan administration’s involvement with supplying arms and training to Afghanistan.

Media coverage or not, few newspapers or TV news channels cover the many dictators and many oppressive governments have been trained, supported, or put into power by American diplomacy and the CIA, subsequently causing some of the most serious cases of genocide throughout the world, though not directly effecting the American people. For example, the oppressive dictator of Indonesia, General Suharto, was considered "one of America’s favorite dictators in East Asia" (Johnson, Blowback: The Cost…, 75). He was placed into power in 1965 through clandestine CIA operations to assassinate his opponent and then-leader of Indonesia, General Sukarno (Johnson, Blowback: The Cost…, 74). Suharto would rule Indonesia as a fundamentalist Islamic state for over three decades, using his armies to uproot and destroy any leftist movements or rebel cells in bloody purges. He established a 450,000-man paramilitary "police" force called the ABRI to keep the people in line through kidnappings and public executions. The ABRI was also the military wing that originally instigated the civil war in East Timor in 1975, and was responsible for the bloody genocides that would occur there in future years. The ABRI was, as were the assassins of General Sukarno, directly trained by the United States. The military’s elite "red beret" wing, the Kopassus, would handle clandestine operations, such as assassination. Eventually, as unrest in the region grew to a fever pitch, violent riots broke out in 1998, which lead to Suharto’s eventual resignation, but the Kopassus continued a campaign of terror through kidnappings and assassinations (Johnson, Blowback: The Cost…, 74-78). The United States, embarrassed by their choice, was one of the major voices in the U.N. that opposed Suharto towards the tail end of the East Timor genocides.

Similar to Suharto in Indonesia, there are many cases American support of oppressive governments throughout the world. General Augusto Pinochet, the infamous dictator of Chile, was placed into power after the United States orchestrated the overthrow of the leader of the previous government, Salvador Allende, in 1973 (Johnson, U.S. Actions…). After Pinochet murdered 4,000 of his own people in an effort to maintain "stability," he was quickly exonerated by the United States. General Noriega, leader of the Panama Defense Forces in Nicaragua, was placed into power by the CIA, and was removed from it in 1989 after it was shown that he was an oppressive leader and had serious dealings in the trafficking of drugs (Johnson, U.S. Actions…). Pol Pot, the ruthless dictator who established the killing fields of Cambodia, used CIA training and tactics to form his dreaded Khmer Rouge organization. The United States has frequently supported governments in an effort to "stabilize" a country, or end the oppression of governments. Little thought is placed into whom we support to achieve such goals, even after the fact.

The United States takes either of two stances when dealing with a case of blowback: forgive and forget, or forcibly depose out of embarrassment. Specifically, we have forgiven and forgotten genocidal dictators like Suharto and Pol Pot, yet we turned against and actively overthrew former allies such as Saddam Hussein and the Taliban. In this current conflict, for example, the Northern Alliance/Mujaheedin has already received our support before prior to being overthrown by our new revolutionaries, the Taliban. Now we’re pushing to get the Mujaheedin back in power a second time, this time with direct military support. The only reason why direct military support is involved this time around is because Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda group (and subsequently, their allies in the Taliban) attacked us directly. Our otherwise current allies do not overlook this inconsistency, and it has been regularly noted within U.N. meetings. These very actions create blowback, which create problems similar to the original conflict. What may seem to be a direct path towards solving a problem have actually harbored, at least in diplomatic situations, long-term difficulties and trials.

The circular nature of this foreign policy presents a problematic situation for the government to break free from. The obvious solution to preventing further heinous acts of terror against the United States is to control the ways of new imperialism. This proposal is difficult to implement, however. As business flows through lines of communication and information, globalization is eventually inevitable. Ideas and political philosophy and sociology transform governments and culture, for better or for worse. If the anger of cultural assimilation can’t be dissuaded, the only other alternative is for the United States to end its methods of clandestine wars and under-the-table military maneuvering. Such actions are usually performed out of respect for the region, and possible backlashes against our steady allies, but with only a vague sense of national security. Working as a shadow government isn’t conducive to trust and friendship, as the United States is stating that they are supporting a faction or nation that they would prefer not to be involved with openly. It’s very difficult not to question the motives or the reasoning behind the involvement of the United States in these situations. The direct way to solve this problem is to avoid, in most situations, joining with nations we could not properly call allies under peacetime circumstance. If two nations hold a common enemy, that doesn’t necessarily mean that they can consider each other allies, such as the case of America and Iraq. Although isolationism can never be a viable diplomatic stance in this modern age of telecommunication, the United States must learn to end its diplomatic secrecy when dealing with other countries and learn to gather better intelligence on potential allies prior to openly accepting them as partners-in-war. Otherwise, when the shot is fired, the American people may get burned, as they did on September 11th.

Works Cited

Adamec, Ludwig W. Dictionary of Afghan Wars, Revolutions, and Insurgencies. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1996.

Baudrillard, Jean. The Gulf War Did Not Take Place. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1995.

Hillsman, Roger. George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure?. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1992.

Johnson, Chalmers. Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. Markham, Ontario: Henry Holt and Company, 2000.

Johnson, Chalmers. Blowback: U.S. Actions Abroad have Repeatedly Led to Unintended, Indefensible Consequences. Available [Online]: < http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=20011015&s=johnson> [15 October, 2001]

© 2002 Meniscus 'zine